The reduction of public funding for political parties in Jalisco (2017-2022)

Abstract

This article focuses on the behavior of the political parties involved in the approval, implementation and abrogation of the reform to reduce public funding for political parties in Jalisco, which was in force from 2017 until 2022. In addition, it analyzes the usefulness of both the revenue maximizing and the electoral economy perspective (rational choice theory) to understand
this case. Results show that the behavior of political parties changes according to the political context and their position in the party system. The largest parties (PRI, PAN and PMC) opted as a priority to waive public funding to obtain a relative advantage in the electoral competition (electoral economy model), and they only opted to increase public funding to themselves when
the electoral cost seemed low; while the minority parties (PVEM and PESJ-Somos) sought at every turn to increase public funding to themselves (revenue-maximizing model).